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I. It is well established in this jurisdiction that a defendant's 
guilty plea to a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, 
pending sentencing, is not admissible for purposes of 
impeachment under Rule 609(a). The admission of such 
evidence in this case was clearly erroneous. Further, it 
affected Hatch's substantial rights. 
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II. It is improper for one witness to be used to offer an opinion 
about the veracity of another witness. Evidence regarding 
a witness' reputation for untruthfulness in the community 
always requires proper foundation, including reputation 
at the time of trial and reputation in the community at 
large as opposed to reputation among police personnel. 
The admission of such evidence in this case was clearly 
erroneous. Further, it affected Hatch's substantial rights. 
III. A prosecutor may not call to the attention of the jury any 
matter it would not be justified in considering in determining 
its verdict. A prosecutor may not express his personal 
opinion as to the truth or falsity of testimony, the guilt 
of the accused, or the justness of the prosecution. The 
prosecutor did so in this case. Absent such misconduct, * 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result 
for Hatch. 
IV. The errors committed during trial were substantial. Even if 
they were harmless individually, they were harmful cumula-
tively. It cannot be said, with any degree of confidence, 
that Hatch received a fair trial. 
V. There was not sufficient evidence to convict Hatch on any 
of the three counts with which she was charged. 
CONCLUSION 
ADDENDUM 
A. Judgment and Order of Commitment, August 31, 1998 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
KANDICE JEAN HATCH, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
\ Appellate Case No. 981585-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment 
Eighth District Court 
Uintah County, State of Utah 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Kandice Jean Hatch, Defendant and Appellant, through counsel, appeals her jury 
convictions on three counts: count (I), burglary of a non-dwelling, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1973); count (II), theft by deception, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1973); and count (III), 
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theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973). The 
court of appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1 
Did the trial court err in allowing the prosecutor to introduce Rule 609(a) 
impeachment evidence against Hatch when the evidence consisted of Hatch's guilty pleas 
to two counts of felony forgery in a separate court action but she had not yet been 
sentenced in that matter? Standard of review: Whether evidence is admissible is a 
question of law which the court of appeals reviews for correctness incorporating a clearly 
erroneous standard of review. Furthermore, in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence, the court of appeals will not reverse that ruling unless a substantial right of the 
party has been affected. State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah App.1993). 
Issue 2 
Did the trial court err in allowing the prosecutor to introduce Rule 608(a) 
character evidence against Hatch when the evidence consisted of a police officer's 
testimony about his impression of Hatch's veracity when he interviewed her as well as 
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her reputation in the community for untruthfulness? Standard of review: Whether 
evidence is admissible is a question of law which the court of appeals reviews for 
correctness incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review. Furthermore, in 
reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, the court of appeals will not reverse 
that ruling unless a substantial right of the party has been affected. Diaz, supra, at 23. 
Issue 3 
Did reversible prosecutorial misconduct occur when the prosecutor introduced 
Rule 609 and Rule 608 evidence against Hatch and also asserted personal knowledge 
and belief about disputed facts and the guilt of the accused? Standard of review: The 
court of appeals will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if defendant 
has shown that the actions or remarks of prosecuting counsel call to the attention of the 
jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict, and, if so, 
under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial and 
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would 
have been a more favorable result. State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 
App.1992), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
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Issue 4 
Was there reversible cumulative error? Standard of review: The court of appeals 
will reverse a conviction if the cumulative effect of several errors undermines the court's 
confidence that defendant was given a fair trial. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 550 
(Utah App. 1998). 
Issue 5 
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Hatch on each of the three counts with 
which she was charged? Standard of review: The court of appeals reviews the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict and will reverse only if that evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which she was convicted. State v. Longshaw, 961 
P.2d 925, 931 (Utah App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Hatch initially was charged with three counts: count (I), burglary of a non-
dwelling, a third degree felony; count (II), theft by deception, a class A misdemeanor; 
and count (III), theft, a class A misdemeanor. Count (II) subsequently was amended to 
theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Preliminary hearing was held on December 10, 1997. Hatch was bound over on, 
and denied, all three counts. A one-day jury trial was held on March 11, 1998. The jury 
found Hatch guilty on all counts. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial count sentenced Hatch on August 4, 1998 as follows: count (I), burglary 
of a non-dwelling, a third degree felony, zero to five years in state prison and a $1,000 
fine; count (II), theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor, six months in jail and a $250 
fine; and count (III), theft, a class A misdemeanor, one year in jail and a $500 fine. 
Prison and jail terms were to be served concurrently. The court also ordered Hatch to 
pay restitution in the amount of $4,200 to Grace Sharp and $705 to Bill Wilson. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
Because Hatch is appealing from a jury verdict, she recites the facts in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict but presents conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to 
clarify issues raised on appeal. State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah App.1996). 
In August 1996 Bill Wilson rented a storage unit at Seeley's Storage in Vernal, 
Utah. He placed numerous items of personal property in the unit. Many belonged to his 
ex-wife, Grace Sharp. On February 28, 1997, when Wilson was at the unit, everything 
was in order. However, on March 15, 1997, when Wilson returned to pick up a washing 
machine, he noticed that the latch on the unit had been broken off. The contents of 
boxes were strewn about. A stereo cabinet was destroyed. Certain items including 
household furniture were missing. Wilson immediately called the police. Deputy 
Anthony Byron, Uintah County Sheriffs Office, responded. When asked, Wilson told 
Byron that he suspected Hatch and her daughters of breaking into the unit and stealing 
items. Tr. 114-16, 126, 155-57. 
On March 19, 1999 Hatch went to Jiffy Pawn in Vernal. She had with her a 
saddle. The saddle had been given to Sharp as a child by her father. Hatch sold the 
saddle to the pawn shop for fifty dollars. She executed a bill of sale, providing 
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her name, date of birth and driver's license ID number. Tr. 145-47,233-34. 
The above facts were undisputed at trial. Disputed, however, was whether the 
saddle had been in Wilson's storage unit at the time of the burglary, as well as whether 
Wilson had given the saddle to Hatch and therefore Hatch was in rightful possession 
when she sold it. Hatch testified that in mid-March 1997 Wilson came to her residence 
and gave her the saddle, as compensation for items of personal property that he had taken 
from a separate storage unit containing her belongings. Tr. 231-33, 257-58. Hatch's 
version of events was supported by the testimony of a daughter, Mandy, who stated that 
she was present when the discussion between Wilson and Hatch occurred. Tr. 211-15. 
Another defense witness, Joseph King, testified that he saw the saddle at Hatch's 
residence and that Hatch told him that Wilson had given it to her. Tr. 220-21. On the 
other hand, Wilson testified that the saddle was in his storage unit in March 1997 and 
that he never had given it to Hatch or told her she could keep it. Tr. 158, 161-63, 175-
76, 267-68. Sharp testified that she gave the saddle to Wilson to put in storage in 
January 1997 and that she never authorized him to dispose of it in any manner. Tr. 182-
83. 
There were no witnesses to the burglary and theft. Fingerprints were not taken at 
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the crime scene. Tr. 126-27. No stolen property, except for the allegedly stolen saddle, 
was ever found in Hatch's possession or linked to her. Therefore the case boiled down to 
the word of Wilson against the word of Hatch. Credibility was all important. In the end, 
the jury believed Wilson and inferred from his testimony, along with the undisputed fact 
that Hatch had sold the saddle to Jiffy Pawn, that Hatch must have burglarized the 
storage unit, taken all of the missing property and received fifty dollars for the saddle by 
deception. 
During trial, the prosecutor repeatedly attacked Hatch's credibility using improper 
means. The prosecutor impeached Hatch by referring to her guilty pleas to two counts of 
felony forgery in a separate court action, even though she had not yet been sentenced in 
that matter. See Tr. 109, 238-48, 253, 279-80, 291. He also had a police officer testify 
about his impression of Hatch's veracity as well as her reputation in the community for 
untruthfulness, despite lack of proper foundation. See Tr. 108-09, 196-99, 248-52, 260, 
261-63, 280. Finally, the prosecutor asserted personal knowledge and belief about 
disputed facts and the guilt of the accused. See Tr. 108-09. These attacks, Hatch 
believes, swayed the jury in its determination of whom to believe and led directly to the 
adverse outcome that she had at trial. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor repeatedly to make improper use 
of Rule 609(a) impeachment evidence against Hatch. Shortly before trial, in a separate 
matter, Hatch had pleaded guilty to two counts of felony forgery. However, she was not 
sentenced until August 1998, some five months after trial. Error occurred when the 
court allowed admission of what were only pending convictions. Hatch's substantial 
rights were affected. The trial court also erred in allowing the prosecutor repeatedly to 
make improper use of Rule 608(a) character evidence against Hatch. A state's witness, a 
police officer, offered his opinion about Hatch's veracity during an investigatory 
interview. The same police officer testified about Hatch's reputation in the community 
for untruthfulness, despite lack of proper foundation. Error occurred here. Hatch's 
substantial rights again were affected. The prosecutor's introduction of Rule 609 and 
Rule 608 evidence rose to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. Such misconduct also 
occurred when the prosecutor asserted personal knowledge and belief about disputed 
facts and the guilt of the accused. Error, even if harmless individually, was harmful 
cumulatively. Finally, there was not sufficient evidence to convict Hatch on any of the 
three counts with which she was charged. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE 
// is well established in this jurisdiction that a defendant's 
guilty plea to a crime involving dishonesty or false state-
ment, pending sentencing, is not admissible for purposes 
of impeachment under Rule 609(a). The admission of 
such evidence in this case was clearly erroneous. Further, 
it affected Hatch's substantial rights. 
Throughout trial the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor repeatedly to 
make improper use of Rule 609(a)(2)1 impeachment evidence against Hatch. 
Remarkably, the prosecutor first attacked Hatch's credibility in opening statement. 
He indicated to the jury, before the fact, that Hatch would testify in her own defense. He 
then said, "We'll see what she has to say. I'll ask you to listen carefully to her.... And 
I'll ask you to listen carefully as I present to her the records of her past, her most recent 
past, her convictions wherein she admitted, finally, to the court that she was lying about 
other things." Tr. 109,11.4-9. 
Hatch did testify at trial. Immediately afterwards, the trial court took a recess and 
called the prosecutor and defense counsel into chambers. It stated, "We are in chambers, 
'Rule 609(a)(2) reads, "(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness,... (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment." 
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and at the court's request, I am going to go over whatever the parties want to get into as 
to the record, criminal record of the defendant. And I do that because if it's not 
admissible, I don't want to prejudice the jury." Tr. 236,11. 8-13. One of the matters 
discussed was Hatch's recent admission to two counts of felony forgery, in a separate 
court action. See generally Tr. 238-48. Over the prosecutor's objections the trial court 
ruled that Hatch's admission could not come in under Rule 404(b). At 239. However, 
at the prosecutor's insistence and absent objection from defense counsel, the court ruled 
that it could come in under Rule 609.2 At 243-44. 
The prosecutor subsequently cross-examined Hatch. The following exchange took 
place: 
Q: ...Have you ever been convicted of a crime involving facilitating a fraud or 
making, completing, executing, authenticating, issuing, transferring, 
publishing, or uttering any writing so that the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
2On February 25, 1998, fifteen days before trial in this case, Hatch had pleaded guilty to 
two counts of felony forgery in a separate court matter. However, her sentencing hearing was not 
held until August 11, 1998, five months to the day after trial. Her judgment and order of 
commitment on the forgery counts was not entered by the court until August 31, 1998. See 
Attachment A, Judgment and Order of Commitment; see also Tr. Exhibit No. 3. 
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purported to be the act of another, specifically, to wit, a number of bank 
checks issued on another person's account? 
A: Yes. I plead guilty on two counts, forgery. 
Q: And those are felony forgeries, and that was within the last few days? Few 
weeks? 
A: About a week ago, I think. 
Tr. 253,11. 2-14. The prosecutor then moved for admission of Exhibit No. 3, the plea 
agreement that Hatch signed when she admitted the forgeries. With no objection from 
defense counsel, the court received the exhibit as evidence. Tr. 253,11. 15-25. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor attacked Hatch's testimony regarding the 
events in question by referring to his impeachment of her. He stated, 'Truth? Or not? 
And as unpleasant as it may be, I am required to remind you that the defendant stands 
before you a convicted felon. Not convicted of something that's irrelevant, but 
something that tells you what kind of person she is." Tr. 279,1. 23 to 280,1. 3. The 
prosecutor also referred to Exhibit No. 3, the plea agreement. He said, "[Y]ou have a 
document of this court, a conviction of this court, Eighth District Court, in which on two 
occasions, at least, the defendant stands convicted before you of a crime of dishonesty." 
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Tr. 280,11. 14-18. 
Finally, in rebuttal, the prosecutor commented on Hatch's credibility, indirectly 
referring to the forgeries. He said, "Now, it's true, there are [sic] some conflicting 
evidence here. Now, we have talked about the defendant's inability to tell the truth and 
be honest." Tr. 291,11. 17-19. 
Errors arguably were made by the trial court, the prosecutor and defense counsel 
alike in the use of Rule 609(a)(2) evidence. The common error is that a defendant's 
admission of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, pending sentencing, does 
not constitute a prior conviction under Rule 609. The matter was first considered in 
State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah App.1990). The court of appeals observed, "In 
view of the liberality with which motions to withdraw guilty pleas are to be granted prior 
to sentence ... we see real difficulty, for Rule 609(a)(2) purposes, in equating a mere 
guilty plea, prior to sentencing, with an actual conviction." At 299 n. 2. Later, in State 
v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah App.1991), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991), 
the court of appeals held, "[I]t is the final judgment of the court on a guilty verdict or 
plea that constitutes a conviction for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1)." The 
holding in Duncan is not limited to subsection (a)(1). The court of appeals clarified, in 
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State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah App.1993), that a defendant's pending sentencing 
is not admissible as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a) generally. 
"Whether evidence is admissible is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, incorporating a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review...." Diaz, supra, at 23 
(citing State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah App.1991); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991); accord State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah 
App.1993), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993)). "Furthermore, 'in reviewing a trial 
court's decision to admit evidence, we will not reverse that ruling unless a substantial 
right of the party has been affected.'" Id. (quoting State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 479 
(Utah App.1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)). 
Applying this standard to the instant case, it was clearly erroneous for the 
prosecutor to refer to--not to mention misrepresent-Hatch's pending forgery convictions 
in opening statement. It was clearly erroneous for the prosecutor to cross-examine Hatch 
about her plea and comment on this matter in closing argument and rebuttal. It likewise 
was clearly erroneous for the jury to be made aware of Exhibit No. 3, Hatch's plea 
agreement. In view of Duncan and Diaz it is well established in this jurisdiction that a 
defendant's guilty plea to a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, pending 
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sentencing, is not admissible for purposes of impeachment under Rule 609(a). 
Hatch's substantial rights, including her right to due process and fundamental 
fairness at trial, were severely affected by the error that occurred. 
The prosecutor's remarks about Hatch's "convictions," in opening statement, were 
particularly egregious and deserve comment. An opening statement can be the most 
critical stage in a jury trial. The jury forms its first and often lasting impression of a case. 
More particularly, as Professor Gershman notes, "Character proof is one of the most 
devastating forms of evidence. The prejudicial impact of the defendant's criminal or 
sordid past on the jury can be overwhelming. (Citing 1 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 
57 (1940) ("The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not because our victim is 
guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he 
is caught, is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court.")). 
Empirical studies suggest that when the jury learns about the defendant's criminal 
history, the chances of acquittal are greatly diminished. (Citing Harry Kalven & Hans 
Zeisel, The American Jury, at 160 (1966) (showing that when a defendant's criminal 
record is known and the prosecution's case has weaknesses, the defendant's chances of 
acquittal are 38 percent, compared to 65 percent otherwise))." Bennett L. Gersham, 
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Trial Error and Misconduct, at 161-62 (1997). 
In addition, as the supreme court has declared in State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 
452 (Utah 1982), 'The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the jury of what 
counsel intends to prove in his own case in chief by way of providing the jury an 
overview of, and general familiarity with, the facts the party intends to prove. (Citation 
omitted.) It is generally accepted that an opening statement should not be argumentative. 
// is not proper to engage in anticipatory rebuttal or to argue credibility by referring 
to impeachment evidence... (emphasis added)." 
The prosecutor* s impeachment of Hatch, not just in opening statement but cross-
examination, closing argument and rebuttal, had a clearly negative cumulative effect. 
The jury heard, again and again, that Hatch was a liar, a dishonest person, whose 
testimony now even under oath was unworthy of belief and surely false. 
Review of the jury instructions shows that they are devoid of any kind of curative 
instruction about the prosecutor's use of Rule 609(a)(2) evidence. This of course is not 
surprising as no one recognized error. However, because error occurred and there was no 
attempt to cure it, Hatch also was prejudiced in this manner. 
Most significantly, there was not convincing properly admitted evidence of all 
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essential elements of the three crimes of which Hatch was convicted. With respect to 
count (I), burglary of a non-dwelling, no witness saw Hatch break into Bill Wilson's 
storage locker. No physical evidence, such as fingerprints, linked Hatch to the scene. 
The prosecutor's case against Hatch was circumstantial. Indeed it was based on the 
highly speculative theory that Hatch was a woman scorned who took revenge on Wilson 
by trashing his locker and stealing a saddle belonging to his ex-wife after Wilson and she 
renewed their relationship. With respect to count (III), theft, Hatch and Wilson both 
testified and gave conflicting evidence about how Hatch came to be in possession of the 
saddle. Hatch said that Wilson gave it to her to make amends after he had taken but not 
returned certain items of personal property belonging to her. Wilson denied giving the 
saddle to Hatch. One of them was lying. In the end, the jury had to decide who was the 
more credible witness. The prosecutor's repeated attacks on Hatch's character, by the 
use of inadmissible evidence, prejudiced the jury and made it impossible for them to 
judge witness credibility fairly. With respect to count (II), theft by deception, assuming 
insufficient proof that Hatch illegally possessed the saddle, there was insufficient proof 
that she deceived Jiffy Enterprises and wrongly obtained money when she sold it. 
For all these reasons, but for the erroneous failure to exclude Hatch's admissions 
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pending sentencing, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
Hatch at trial. See State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989) (stating "the standard 
for reversal in cases involving an erroneous failure to exclude prior convictions is 
whether absent the error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
the defendant"). Error, in the instant case, clearly was harmful not harmless. It led 
directly to the adverse outcome that Hatch had at trial. Hatch's convictions on all three 
counts should be reversed. 
II. CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
It is improper for one witness to be used to offer an opinion 
about the veracity of another witness. Evidence regarding 
a witness' reputation for untruthfulness in the community 
always requires proper foundation, including reputation 
at the time of trial and reputation in the community at 
large as opposed to reputation among police personnel 
The admission of such evidence in this case was clearly 
erroneous. Furtherf it affected Hatch's substantial rights. 
Throughout trial, the trial court also erred in allowing the prosecutor repeatedly to 
make improper use of Rule 608(a)3 character evidence against Hatch. 
3Rule 608(a) reads, "(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility 
of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but 
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the 
witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." 
18 
The prosecutor, in opening statement, made reference to Sergeant Hatzidakis, a 
state's witness. He said, "And then we'll also ask you to listen to Sergeant Hatzidakis as 
he tells you what happened when he went to confront the defendant and how her story 
shifted and changed to suit what might be most convenient, and how he didn't think he 
could believe her simply because she was telling a shifting story." Tr. 108,1. 23 to 109, 
1. 4. This was error. It is improper for one witness to be used to offer an opinion about 
the credibility of another witness. Injury trials, it is the jury alone who are the judges of 
witnesses' truthfulness or untruthfulness. State v. Stefanik, 900 P.2d 1094, 1095-96 
(Utah App.1995) (citing State v. RammeU 720 P.2d 498, 500 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1989); State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 
1993)). Even more to the point, the supreme court expressly has stated that "Under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 608(a) and Rimmasch, one witness may not testify as to the credibility 
of statements made by another person on a particular occasion." State v. Harmon, 956 
P.2d262,271 (Utah 1998). 
The prosecutor, on direct examination, asked Hatzidakis about his experience and 
training as an interrogator, then about his impression of Hatch when he interviewed her 
following the burglary of Wilson's locker. See generally Tr. 196-99. Sua sponte, the 
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trial court objected to the prosecutor in effect inviting Hatzidakis to comment on Hatch's 
credibility during the interview. "Just a minute. It's asking him to evaluate and comment 
on the truthfulness of the statement." Tr. 198,11. 12-14. Significantly, however, the 
court based its action not on Rule 608 or Rimmasch but rather the fact that Hatzidakis 
was "not qualified" to make such comments. Id.; see also Tr. 199,11. 4-5. The court 
never identified the true nature of the error that had occurred. Likewise, it never cured 
the error by instructing the jury that they should disregard the remarks of Hatzidakis 
insofar as he referred to Hatch's credibility. 
Also, when the prosecutor and defense were in chambers, immediately following 
Hatch's direct testimony, the prosecutor indicated that he wished to recall Sergeant 
Hatzidakis as a rebuttal witness to testify about Hatch's reputation for untruthfulness. 
There was a colloquy about Rule 608(a). See generally Tr. 248-52. The court ruled 
that Rule 608 evidence would be allowed in. At 251-52. 
Hatzidakis testified as a rebuttal witness. However, before asking Hatzidakis about 
Hatch's reputation for untruthfulness, the prosecutor had him, one more time, comment 
improperly on her credibility. Hatch had testified that to the best of her memory she had 
had only two interactions with Hatzidakis over a twelve-year period. The prosecutor 
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now asked Hatzidakis, "Sergeant... you just heard the defendant testify that she's only 
dealt with you on two occasions over those twelve years that you have been here in 
town. Would you please tell the jury whether that's accurate or not?" Tr. 260,11. 5-9. 
Hatzidakis answered, "Very inaccurate." Tr. 260,1. 10. In view of Rule 608(a) and 
Rimmasch this also was error. The prosecutor certainly was permitted to ask Hatzidakis 
how many times Hatch and he had had contact over a specific period of time. He was 
entitled to point out any discrepancy in the testimony of Hatch and Hatzidakis at an 
appropriate moment, for instance in closing argument. But he should not have had 
Hatzidakis say in so many words that Hatch lied or was dishonest in her testimony about 
their contact. 
The prosecutor eventually asked Hatzidakis about Hatch's reputation for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and Hatzidakis, in response, said, "I think [her reputation] 
would be more towards the untruthfulness or deceptive." See Tr. 262,1.25 to 263,1. 13. 
The question was put to Hatzidakis improperly. For one thing, whether a witness 
simply has a reputation for untruthfulness is irrelevant. What is relevant is w hether a 
witness has a reputation for untruthfulness during the time period when he or she gives 
testimony as a witness. The prosecutor, in the instant case, lay no foundation whatsoever 
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that Hatch had a reputation for untruthfulness at the time of trial. See United States v. 
Null 415 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1969) (stating that reputation for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness must be established at the time of trial). Furthermore, the trial court 
erroneously lifted the burden that the prosecutor had to lay foundation as to the 
"community" in which Hatch had her reputation. The court, correctly, noted that 
Hatzidakis needed to testify about Hatch's reputation in the community, not among law 
enforcement personnel. Tr. 261,1. 23 to 262,1. 2. The prosecutor and defense counsel 
argued about this matter. When defense counsel objected that the prosecutor still was 
not laying proper foundation with reference to the community at large, the court 
overruled him, saying that that was a matter for cross-examination. Tr. 263,11. 4-9. The 
prosecutor never did set forth sufficient foundation showing the specific nature and 
extent of the community in which Hatch's reputation for untruthfulness supposedly 
existed. 
The prosecutor's failure to lay proper foundation as to Hatch's reputation in the 
community is reflected in his confusing reputation evidence and opinion evidence in 
closing argument. The prosecutor had indicated, in chambers, that he wished to use 
Hatzidakis to inform the jury about Hatch's reputation in the community. In closing 
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argument, though, the prosecutor stated that what Hatzidakis had testified to was his 
opinion of Hatch's reputation in the community. "And he's able to tell you what her 
reputation is. And that was his opinion." Tr. 280,11. 8-9. Properly speaking, there are 
two distinct forms of Rule 608 character evidence. Evidence of a person's reputation 
among members of the community is reputation evidence. Evidence consisting of a 
witness' personal opinion is opinion evidence. Hatzidakis in fact only gave opinion 
evidence. The prosecutor misrepresented that in Hatzidakis' rebuttal testimony and 
improperly led the jury to believe that Hatch's reputation among people in the 
community was that of an untruthful or deceptive person. 
"Whether evidence is admissible is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, incorporating a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review...." Diaz, supra, at 
23 (citations omitted). "Furthermore, 'in reviewing a trial court's decision whether to 
admit evidence, we will not reverse that ruling unless a substantial right of the party has 
been affected." Id. (citation omitted). 
For the reasons stated, it was clearly erroneous for evidence to come in indirectly 
from the prosecutor and directly from Sergeant Hatzidakis about Hatch's credibility 
during police interview. It was clearly erroneous for Hatzidakis to indicate that Hatch 
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lied when she testified that the two of them had had only limited contact with each other 
over a twelve-year period. It also was clearly erroneous for Hatzidakis to present 
evidence about Hatch's reputation in the community for untruthfulness. Hatch's 
substantial rights at trial were affected. The only piece of evidence linking Hatch to the 
three crimes with which she was charged was the saddle, which she always freely 
admitted that she pawned. How she came to be in possession of the saddle was the main 
factual issue in the instant case. Hatch testified that Wilson gave it to her. Wilson 
testified that he did not. The case, then, boiled down to one person's word against 
another. The jury needed to make a decision about whom to believe. However, the 
jury's decision-making was clouded even poisoned by the improper introduction of Rule 
608(a) reputation evidence. The jury heard, repeatedly, that Hatzidakis believed Hatch 
was lying to him and that she had a reputation in the community for untruthfulness. The 
jury should have heard none of this evidence. But for its erroneous admission, there was 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for Hatch at trial. State v. Bruce, 
supra, at 656. Hatch's convictions on all three counts should be reversed on this 
separate ground. 
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III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
A prosecutor may not call to the attention of the jury any 
matter it would not be justified in considering in deter-
mining its verdict. A prosecutor may not express his 
personal opinion as to the truth or falsity of testimony, 
the guilt of the defendant, or the justness of the prosecu-
tion. The prosecutor did so in this case. Absent such 
misconduct, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for Hatch. 
The prosecutor's introduction of Rule 609 and Rule 608 evidence against Hatch 
rose to the level of misconduct. Such misconduct also occurred when the prosecutor, in 
opening statement, asserted personal knowledge and belief about disputed facts and the 
guilt of the accused. 
"[The court of appeals] will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only 
if defendant has shown that %the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the 
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict, and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, 
there would have been a more favorable result....'" State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 
(Utah App.1992) (quoting State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App.1990)), cert 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
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The prosecutor repeatedly called to the attention of the jury Hatch's "convictions" 
on two counts of forgery. However, at the time of trial, Hatch only had admitted the 
offenses in a recent change of plea hearing. She was not yet sentenced. Under Rule 
609(a), the jury never should have been informed of Hatch's pending convictions and 
made use of this information in determining its verdict. 
The prosecutor also repeatedly called to the attention of the jury Sergeant 
Hatzidakis' impression of the veracity of Hatch and her reputation in the community for 
untruthfulness. Rule 608(a), though, bars using one witness to comment on the 
credibility of another witness. Furthermore, under the rule it is axiomatic that reputation 
evidence is inadmissible without the proponent of the evidence laying proper foundation. 
In view of this, the jury never should have heard the prosecutor's remarks along with 
Hatzidakis' testimony and considered these matters in reaching a verdict. 
The errors that occurred were substantial and prejudicial in nature. They 
represented significant violations of the rules of evidence. They came at critical junctures 
in the trial, in particular opening statement, cross-examination of the defendant and 
closing argument. They undoubtedly swayed the jury in assessing the credibility of 
Hatch and Wilson as witnesses. Most fundamentally, the errors obviated Hatch's right to 
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due process and fundamental fairness at trial. There is a reasonable likelihood that, in 
the absence of the errors, Hatch would have had a more favorable result. 
In addition to all this, the prosecutor, in opening statement, told the jury, "And 
after the case is over, the best thing here today is, I am going to be able to give Grace her 
saddle back." Tr. 108.11. 15-17. This implied, at the very least, that the prosecutor 
believed that Hatch stole it. Shortly later the prosecutor said, "But you are here to do 
one thing, and that's to find the truth. And the truth is this defendant got mad, she tore 
up Bill Wilson's storage shed, busted up his entertainment center. She took the saddle. 
...Saddle went down to Jiff} Pawn. Jiffy Pawn made out the money. They are out the 
money. Grace is out the saddle. And the defendant is here today to answer for it." Tr. 
109,11. 13-22. Here the prosecutor's belief in Hatch's guilt, as well as his belief 
concerning the central disputed fact in the case, was made explicit. 
The jury should not have heard what the prosecutor said. "A prosecutor is not 
allowed to express his personal opinion as to the truth or falsity of testimony, the guilt of 
the defendant, or the justness of the prosecution. (Citing ABA Standards, 3-5.8(b) ("The 
prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or 
falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.")). Such remarks are 
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forbidden for two reasons: they unfairly exploit the prosecutor's standing and prestige 
with the jury, and they imply that the prosecutor has access to information outside the 
record that supports his assertions. (Citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 
(1985))." Trial Error and Misconduct, supra, at 186. 
The position of the supreme court, in this jurisdiction, is in accord with the ABA 
Standards and Young, "[A] prosecutor engages in misconduct when he or she asserts 
personal knowledge of the facts in issue or expresses personal opinion, being 'a form of 
unsworn, unchecked testimony [which] tends[s] to exploit the influence of the 
prosecutor's office and undermine the objective detachment that should separate a 
lawyer from the cause being argued." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 
1989) (quoting State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255-56 (Utah 1988)) (alterations in 
original). 
The remarks of the prosecutor in opening statement, in the form that they took, 
constitute reversible prosecutorial misconduct. They were error. The error was 
substantial and prejudicial in that the prosecutor's assertions of personal knowledge and 
belief were made when the jury was forming its first and perhaps lasting impression of the 
case. The error was magnified further because of the nature of the case, in essence a 
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swearing contest between Hatch and Wilson, and the introduction of Rule 609 and Rule 
608 evidence against Hatch throughout trial. The prosecutor crossed the line marking the 
boundary of zealous advocacy. Had he not done so, there was in fact a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for Hatch. 
IV. CUMULATIVE ERROR 
The errors committed during trial were substantial Even 
if they were harmless individually, they were harmful 
cumulatively. It cannot be said, with any degree of confi-
dence, that Hatch received a fair trial. 
The instant appeal, perhaps most basically, is about prosecutorial overzealous-
ness. The counsel that the United States Supreme Court gave to prosecutors in 1935 
comes to mind and certainly is as relevant now as it was then. 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, 
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and 
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim 
of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he 
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to 
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means 
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to bring about a just one. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The prosecutor, here, did not just 
strike hard blows. He struck foul blows. More than that, he struck foul blows over and 
over again in opening statement, the case in chief, closing argument and rebuttal. 
The foul blows in opening statement were that the prosecutor referred to Hatch's 
pending forgery convictions, Sergeant Hatzidakis' impression of Hatch's veracity during 
his interview of her, his own belief about Hatch's guilt and his own opinion concerning 
facts in issue. The foul blows in the case in chief were that the prosecutor impeached 
Hatch using only pending convictions and asked Hatzidakis about Hatch's credibility 
during interview and her reputation in the community for untruthfulness despite lack of 
foundation. The foul blows in closing argument and rebuttal were that the prosecutor 
again pointed out Hatch's pending convictions and her reputation in the community. 
The cumulative error doctrine, without question, is applicable to the instant case. 
See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah App.1998). The errors that were 
committed during the course of trial were substantial in nature. Even if they were 
harmless individually, they were harmful cumulatively. They raise the very serious 
question of whether Hatch received a fair trial. Hatch believes that the court of appeals 
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cannot say, with any degree of confidence, that she was given a fair trial. Accordingly, 
all of Hatch convictions should be reversed on this separate ground. 
V. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
There was not sufficient evidence to convict Hatch on any 
of the three counts with which she was charged. 
An element of burglary is entering or remaining unlawfully in a building. In the 
instant case, there was no direct evidence that Hatch went to Seeley's Storage and broke 
into Wilson's storage unit. No one saw Hatch break in. No physical evidence, such as 
fingerprints, linked Hatch to the crime scene. No stolen property, except for the 
allegedly stolen saddle, was ever found in Hatch's possession. The jury's verdict, on this 
count, was based on Wilson's testimony that the saddle was in his storage unit in March 
1997 together with the fact, never disputed, that Hatch took the saddle to Jiffy Pawn and 
sold it. The jury did not believe Hatch's version of events, in particular her testimony 
that Wilson gave her the saddle as compensation for property that he had taken from her. 
The jury inferred that Hatch must have been the party who broke into Wilson's storage 
unit. However, viewed objectively, the jury's inference was unreasonable. It rested not 
on good evidence but bad evidence, specifically that Hatch was a bad person who had 
been convicted of crimes of dishonesty in the past, appeared to be lying when Sergeant 
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Hatzidakis interviewed her, and supposedly had a reputation for untruthfulness in the 
community. The jury should not have heard or considered any of this bad evidence. 
Absent it, Hatch's credibility at trial would have been much greater. The jury would 
have had a much more difficult even impossible time deciding whether Wilson or Hatch 
was telling the truth. Accordingly, members of the jury must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that Hatch entered Wilson's storage unit and actually committed the 
crime of burglary. Hatch's conviction on count (I) should be reversed. See State v. 
Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 931 (Utah App.1998) (regarding claims of insufficiency of 
evidence, the court of appeals reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
from that evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and will reverse only if 
that evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which she 
was convicted). 
The same analysis applies to count (II), theft by deception, and count (III), theft. 
There was deception, with respect to Jiffy Pawn, only if Hatch wrongfully was in 
possession of the saddle. There was theft only if Hatch stole the saddle along with other 
items of property from Wilson's storage unit. The jury's inferences that Hatch did not 
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receive the saddle from Wilson and that she in fact took the saddle and other property 
were based, again, on Wilson's testimony and more fundamentally his witness credibility 
as opposed to her witness credibility. Hatch's credibility was irreparably damaged by 
bad evidence that the prosecutor repeatedly used against her at trial. Had the jury not 
been presented with such evidence, there is every likelihood that reasonable minds would 
have entertained reasonable doubt that Hatch committed the crimes of theft by deception 
and theft. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals should reverse Hatch's convictions on all three counts and 
remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
DATED this _ day of June, 1999. 
( / V - A S ^ 
WESLEY M. BADEN 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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JoANN B, STRINGHAM, #03 53 
Uintah County Attorney-
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 435-781-5436 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. : JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT 
vs. : 
KANDICE HATCH, : CASE NO. 981800008 FS 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Defendant. : 
This matter having come on regularly before this Court for 
sentencing on the 11th day of August, 1998, the Honorable John R. 
Anderson presiding. The State being represented by JoAnn B. 
Stringham, Uintah County Attorney, and the Defendant being 
personally present and represented by counsel, John C. Beaslin. 
The defendant having been convicted of or having plead guilty 
to two counts of FORGERY, Third Degree felonies, in violation of 
Section 76-6-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The Court, having received a Pre-Sentence Investigation 
Report from the Department of Corrections, having reviewed the 
same, the Defendant, having previously been furnished the said Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, admitted there were no inaccuracies 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
y£LERK 
DEPUTY 
or was furnished the opportunity to have a hearing to challenge any 
claimed inaccuracies, and no legal reason having been shown why 
judgment and sentencing should not be pronounced, entered a 
Judgment as follows: 
1. That the Defendant is hereby sentenced on Count I, 
FORGERY, a Third Degree Felony, to serve zero (0) to Five (5) years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
2. That the Defendant is sentenced on Count II, FORGERY, a 
Third Degree Felony, to serve zero (0) to Five (5) years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
3. That these prison terms be served concurrent with each 
other and with Judge Payne's burglary charge, Case No. 971800246. 
4. That the Defendant pay restitution in the total amount of 
ONE THOUSAND FORTY AND NO/100 DOLLAR ($1,040.00) . Said restitution 
should be paid to the Eighth Judicial District Court and reimbursed 
to the victims as follows: 
a. NINE HUNDRED SIXTY DOLLARS ($960.00) payable to 
Davis IGA, 575 West Main, Vernal, Utah 84078. 
b. EIGHTY DOLLARS ($80.00) payable to Smith's Food 
King, 108 0 West Highway 40, Vernal, Utah 84 07 8. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That the Defendant is forthwith remanded to the custody of the 
Uintah County Sheriff for transportation to the Utah State Prison 
and execution of the sentence given herein. 
DATED this ?/ day of August, 1998/w^ 
/^JOHN R. ANDERSON 
(/ District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/fofiN C. BEASLIN 
At/torney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivered, a true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
COMMITMENT to John C. Beaslin, Attorney for Defendant, 185 North 
Vernal Avenue, Vernal, UT 84078; Department of Corrections, 152 
East 100 North, Vernal, UT; and the Uintah County Jail, Vernal, UT 
84078. 
